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ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Harding Was Afforded Due Process and Equal Protection Under the 
Law as Directed By This Court Pursuant to Its Constitutional Authority. 
Mr. Harding claims he was denied a full and fair hearing, including the 
opportunity to confront witnesses, and because of this was denied the right of 
constitutional due process. See Brief of Respondent at 11-15. This claim is without 
merit. 
This Court's Order of Reference correctly points out that "[p]ursuant to Rule 6, 
Rujes_of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, this Court has exclusive authority to review 
the [attorney] licensure status of Ray Harding, Jr." based on his status as a former judge 
and the fact that the allegations of misconduct occurred while he was a sitting judge. 
Order of Reference, March 25, 2003; see also Rule 6(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability ("RLDD"). The Order of Reference directed the Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC") "to proceed with a disciplinary review [of Mr. Harding] under its 
ordinary rules, but with its conclusions and recommendations regarding Mr. Harding's 
license to practice law to be submitted directly to [the Supreme Court] for final action." 
Order of Reference, March 25, 2003. The "ordinary rules" are the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the RLDD, and the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards"). 
Based thereon, the OPC initiated an informal complaint against Mr. Harding 
pursuant to its authority under Rule 10(a)(1) of the RLDD. See Notice of Informal 
Complaint at 1. This was preceded by an OPC investigation pursuant to Rule 4(b)(2) of 
the RLDD which resulted in the service of a Notice of Informal Complaint on Mr. Harding 
on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD. See id. Furthermore, 
in accordance with Rule 10(a)(5) of the RLDD, the OPC's Notice of Informal Complaint 
"identified with particularity the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct . . . as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel." Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see 
also Notice of Informal Complaint at 1-5. 
The RLDD permit a respondent 20 days for response to the Notice of Informal 
Complaint. See Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see also Notice of Informal Complaint at 4. 
However, the OPC agreed to allow Mr. Harding additional time to respond, and Mr. 
Harding did respond to the Notice of Informal Complaint by letter dated September 5, 
2003. See Rule 10(a)(5), RLDD; see also Harding Response to Notice of Informal 
Complaint at 1. After reviewing Mr. Harding's response, and because the OPC could 
not resolve or dismiss the matter pursuant to the standards of Rule 10(a)(6) of the 
RLDD, the OPC served a Calendar Notice on Mr. Harding for a hearing before a 
Screening Panel of this Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee ("Screening Panel"). 
See Calendar Notice; see also Rule 3, RLDD. The Screening Panel hearing was set for 
and held on January 22, 2004. See Screening Panel Decision Sheet with 
Recommendation. 
The procedures for Screening Panel hearings are set forth in the following 
provisions of Rule 10 of the RLDD: 
(b) Proceedings before committee and screening panels. 
(1) Review and investigation. A screening panel shall review all informal 
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts 
developed by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and 
hearing, and the recommendations of OPC counsel. 
(2) Respondent's appearance. Before any action is taken which may 
result in the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal 
complaint, the screening panel shall, upon at least fourteen (14) days 
notice, afford the respondent an opportunity to appear before the 
screening panel and testify under oath, together with any witnesses 
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called by the respondent, and to present an oral argument with 
respect to the informal complaint. All testimony shall be recorded and 
preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event, not 
less than six (6) months following the hearing. A written brief may also 
be submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall 
not exceed five (5) pages in length unless permission for enlargement 
is extended by the chair or the chair's delegate for good cause shown. 
A copy of the brief shall be forwarded by OPC counsel to the 
complainant. 
(3) Complainant's appearance. A complainant shall have the right to 
appear before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, 
together with any witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to 
the informal complaint or in opposition to the matters presented by the 
respondent. The complainant may be represented by counsel or some 
other representative. 
(4) Right to hear evidence. The complainant and the respondent shall 
each have the right to be present during the presentation of the 
evidence unless excluded by the screening panel chair for good 
cause shown. 
These procedures were followed. Additionally, although not required to do so by the 
RLDD, for the convenience of the Screening Panel and all respondents, including Mr. 
Harding, the OPC submits a Screening Panel Memorandum to outline the facts, provide 
appropriate legal analysis, and determinations of its investigation. See Screening Panel 
Memorandum. Such a Screening Panel Memorandum was served on Mr. Harding and 
Mr. Harding responded to it. See Harding Response to OPC Screening Panel 
Memorandum. 
Mr. Harding participated at the hearing, he testified, he presented witnesses, he 
presented evidence, and his counsel presented argument. See e.g. Respondent's 
Screening Panel Witness List. The OPC concedes that Mr. Harding was not allowed to 
cross-examine witnesses and that all witness questioning was done by the Screening 
Panel members. However, the RLDD, promulgated by the Supreme Court, do not 
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require "cross examination" or direct questioning of witnesses by a party as a 
requirement of a "fair" hearing and due process in an attorney discipline matter. See in 
re Kline D. Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 586 (Utah 1980) (in addressing the due process 
afforded an attorney in an attorney discipline matter, the Court stated: "The action 
[attorney discipline action] is not an action at law in the strict sense nor a suit in equity. 
The attorney against whom the accusations have been made is entitled to a fair hearing 
and the right to present such evidence as he may be able to produce to rebut, or 
overcome the allegations of misconduct; . . ."). At the Screening Panel hearing, both 
the OPC and Mr. Harding were allowed to suggest any area of questioning of any 
witness that the Screening Panel members did not cover. Thus, even without cross-
examination, Mr. Harding cannot truly state he lacked the opportunity to confront 
witnesses. And, both prior to and during the hearing, Mr. Harding had an opportunity to 
know all that he must to meet, rebut, or overcome the allegations of misconduct. 
It should also be noted that, in the OPC's view, Mr. Harding's claim of a right to 
cross-examine witnesses is based on an erroneous analogy of attorney discipline 
proceedings to criminal proceedings where there is such a right. This Court has made it 
very clear, however, that "Bar disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature. . ." In re 
Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 214 (Utah 1997) (quoting In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 707 (Utah 
1986) and In re Brown, 906 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Cal. 1995)); see ajso Rule 17(a), RLDD. 
Thus, such an analogy is misplaced. 
Additionally, Mr. Harding claims he was denied equal protection because, unlike 
other respondents, he was denied a District Court hearing. This claim is also without 
merit. The Court has long since held that "the practice of law is not a right accredited all 
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citizens, but is a privilege extended only upon showing good character, meeting 
required qualifications and maintaining proper professional standards." In re Grant 
MacFarlane Sr„ 350 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1960); see also In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 
(Utah 1980). Through its constitutional charge to "govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law," this Court has the authority to promulgate the procedures for the discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law. See Utah Const, at VIII, § 4; see also In re Johnson, 
48 P.3d 881, 886 (Utah 2001); In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997). The Court 
exercised this authority by promulgating the RLDD. 
Nothing in the Constitution or the current rules precludes this Court from 
bypassing a District Court determination in an attorney disciplinary case, especially in 
light of Rule 6(c)'s assertion of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a 
former judge where all the misconduct allegations occurred while he was a sitting judge. 
Furthermore, the ultimate power of discipline of any attorney constitutionally lies with 
this Court, and in such actions, the District Court acts only as this Court's agent. See Jn 
re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881, 886 (2001 Utah). Accordingly, the Court is within its 
constitutional authority to designate the Screening Panel as its "agent" in this case, and 
doing so did not deprive Mr. Harding of due process or equal protection. 
II. This Court Should Draw Different Inferences From the Facts as Found 
By the Screening Panel, and Make an Independent Judgment That Mr. 
Harding Either Should Be Disbarred or Suspended for a Three- or Two-
Year Period. 
This Court has a different role in attorney discipline cases than in other civil 
cases on appeal. It has stated: 
[I]n light of our constitutional mandate and "the unique nature of 
disciplinary actions and our knowledge of the nature of the practice of 
law," we accord less deference to the findings of a lower tribunal. "We . . . 
reserve the right to draw inferences from basic facts which may differ from 
the inferences drawn by the [lower tribunal]." Although we recognize as a 
general proposition the district court's advantaged position in overall 
familiarity with the evidence and the context of the case, on appeal we 
must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our responsibility. 
"In this regard, it is imperative to bear in mind that the review of attorney 
discipline proceedings is fundamentally different from judicial review of 
administrative proceedings," id., or of other district court cases. 
In sum, this Court will ordinarily presume that the [lower tribunal's] findings 
of fact are correct, although we may set those findings aside if they are not 
supported by the evidence. If the evidence warrants, we may make an 
independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline, 
although we always give serious consideration to the findings and [rulings] 
of the [district court]. 
In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997); see ajso Order, In re Ray Harding, Jr., 
Case No. 20020535-SC (where the Court stated its intent to consider the full range of 
disciplinary sanctions available). 
The OPC has not challenged the factual findings of the Screening Panel. 
However, as set forth in its initial Brief, the OPC considers that the Screening Panel 
erred in concluding that Mr. Harding did not violate Rule 8.4(a) and (d) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct; that the Screening Panel erred in finding that there were no 
aggravating circumstances; that the Screening Panel erred by according too much 
weight to those in mitigation; and that the Screening Panel erred in recommending that 
the appropriate sanction should be a five-year probation. As outlined in its initial Brief, 
the OPC contends that this Court should draw a different inference from the evidence 
and determine that Mr. Harding either should be disbarred, or suspended for a three- or 
two-year period. 
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III. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Attorney Discipline Matter Because It 
Made No Final Determination on Mr. Harding's Judicial Misconduct. 
Rule 6(c) of the RLDD states: 
A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not only for conduct as a lawyer but also 
for misconduct that occurred while the lawyer was a judge and would have 
been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the misconduct was not 
the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been 
a final determination by the Supreme Court. 
Mr. Harding's misconduct was the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding, 
but the Court never finally disposed of that proceeding because Mr. Harding resigned 
his judgeship. See letter of resignation from Mr. Harding, Feb. 28, 2003. Indeed, the 
Final Order of this Court stated that its consideration of the Utah Judicial Conduct 
Commission's recommended sanction of removal "has become moot" based on Mr. 
Harding's resignation. See Final Order, March 25, 2003. 
The Court's statement that Mr. Harding is permanently disqualified from serving 
in any judicial or quasi-judicial position in the State of Utah appears to be consistent 
with Mr. Harding's condition of resignation - that is, Mr. Harding stated that he "will not 
seek judicial office in the future." See Harding letter of resignation. Thus, the Court's 
statement was not a determination of misconduct but rather an acceptance of Mr. 
Harding's offer. 
The OPC concedes that if Mr. Harding had not resigned and this Court had 
adjudicated Mr. Harding's misconduct after consideration of the recommendation of the 
Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, Mr. Harding might have had a colorable argument 
of lack of jurisdiction under Rule 6(c) of the RLDD. However, this is not the case. 
IV. Although the OPC Recognizes the Role of Lawyers Helping Lawyers in 
Assisting Lawyers With Substance Abuse, Addiction, or Mental Health 
Issues, Its Role in Attorney Discipline Matters Should Be Confined to Any 
Evidence It Can Provide in Accordance With the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. 
The OPC understands that Lawyers Helping Lawyers has filed a Motion for 
Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief. The OPC responds as follows: 
The OPC appreciates the work and involvement of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers 
Program in assisting lawyers with substance abuse, addiction, or mental health issues. 
Certainly if these issues can be addressed prior to misconduct, everyone is well served. 
In the OPC's view, however, once misconduct has occurred, the role of Lawyers 
Helping Lawyers in the attorney discipline process should be limited to pertinent 
evidence for consideration under the Standards. There is no attorney discipline rule to 
provide a basis for an expansion of the role of Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program in this 
case or in any other attorney discipline case. 
Mr. Richard Uday, Director of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program, provided 
helpful testimony to the Screening Panel with respect to Mr. Harding's substance abuse 
and his claim of a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation. See 
Rule 6.3(i), Standards. Mr. Uday also testified regarding his personal contact with Mr. 
Harding and Mr. Harding's contacts with the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program. 
Because all these contacts were with Mr. Harding after he committed misconduct, the 
evidence provided through Mr. Uday should only be considered under the Standards. 
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It should also be noted that since the Lawyers Helping Lawyers role is limited to 
individual cases, Mr. Harding's case will not have a tremendous impact on the 
effectiveness of the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program in other cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before this Court is the appropriate attorney discipline sanction to be 
imposed on Mr. Ray Harding Jr. for misconduct that occurred while he was a sitting 
state court judge. This Court has clear exclusive constitutional authority and jurisdiction 
to determine what the appropriate attorney discipline sanction should be. This 
jurisdictional authority is expressed in the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. At 
the end of Mr. Harding's judicial disciplinary proceeding, this Court maintained 
jurisdiction over Mr. Harding's case because it had made no determination of 
misconduct: Mr. Harding resigned before this Court made a final determination of 
misconduct. 
Furthermore, this Court has properly directed that Mr. Harding's misconduct be 
initially considered in accordance with the attorney discipline rules with the final decision 
to be made by the Court. Pursuant to the attorney discipline rules, Mr. Harding was 
provided notice and a fair hearing before a Screening Panel of this Court's Ethics and 
Discipline Committee. At the hearing, Mr. Harding testified, presented witnesses for 
questioning by the Screening Panel, was allowed to suggest areas for questioning all 
witnesses, including OPC witnesses, and was allowed to offer evidence and argument 
to rebut the OPC or otherwise support his position. Nothing in the Constitution requires 
cross-examination of witnesses to constitute a fair hearing in attorney discipline cases. 
Similarly, based on this Court's constitutional authority, a lawyer's equal protection is 
not violated by this Court designating a Screening Panel to conduct a hearing in lieu of 
the District Court in cases where the lawyer's misconduct occurred while he was a 
sitting judge. 
The OPC did not challenge the Screening Panel's factual findings, but disagrees 
with its conclusion that the appropriate sanction for Mr. Harding is a five-year probation. 
In the OPC's viewpoint, based on the evidence, the appropriate sanction should be 
disbarment or a three- or two-year suspension. 
Finally, although the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program fills a valuable role in 
helping those with substance abuse, addiction, or mental health issues, when its 
involvement is after misconduct has occurred, as in this case, its role in the disciplinary 
proceedings should be limited to the evidence that it might provide in mitigation under 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
DATED: April 2 2 ,2004. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Billy L. Walker 
Senior Counsel 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 22- day 0f April, 2004, I caused to be mailed via 
United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief 
to Gregory G. Skordas and Jack M. Morgan, Jr., counsel for the Respondent/Appellee, 
at the following address: SKORDAS & CASTON, LLC, Boston Building, Suite 1104, 9 





Harding's Letter of Resignation 
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
In the Matter of the ) 
Complaint by 
) 




Ray Harding, Jr., 
Attorney at Law ) 
To: The above-named Complainant and Respondent: 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") has referred the 
above-identified informal complaint for review by a Screening Panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court. 
The Screening Panel is appointed by the Utah Supreme Court to hear and consider 
complaints filed against Respondents for alleged violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. This panel has the authority to dismiss the complaint(s), dismiss with 
condition(s), issue a caution to the Respondent, issue a private admonishment to the 
Respondent, issue a public reprimand to the Respondent, or determine that there is 
probable cause to authorize filing a formal complaint against the Respondent for further 
proceedings. The Screening Panel in disciplinary matters is concerned only with the 
Respondent's alleged conduct and cannot order restitution for repayment of money or a 
judgment against the Respondent. 
Pursuant to Rule 10(b)(1) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
("RLDD"), as amended January 1, 2003, the Screening Panel has the authority to make 
its determination based on facts developed by the informal complaint, answer, 
investigation, the OPC recommendation, and in the Screening Panel hearing. In this 
respect, facts developed at the hearing may give rise to a determination of Rules of 
Professional Conduct violations not previously alleged in the Notice of Informal 
Complaint(s) in this matter. 
The Screening Panel will conduct a hearing in this matter on Thursday, January 
22, 2004 beginning at 1:00 p.m. at the Utah Law and Justice Center at 645 South 200 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah. Please note that it would be advisable that you arrive fifteen 
minutes prior to the time set for your case so that if a case scheduled before your case 
ends early, you will be ready to proceed earlier than your appointed time. Each case 
will be set to be heard in a maximum one and a one-half hour time period. 
CALENDAR NOTICE 
03-0417 
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Complainants and Respondents will be allowed to present their case as set forth 
below within this maximum time period. If a Complainant or Respondent feels that 
additional time is needed for their case to be heard, a written request for this additional 
time must be made to the OPC within five working days from the date of this Calendar 
Notice. The written request must specify with particularity the reasons for the additional 
time. The OPC will forward the request for additional time to the Chair or Vice Chair of 
the Screening Panel, who will announce at the time and place set for the hearing whether 
additional time will be allowed. 
Prior to every case the members of the Screening Panel will have had an 
opportunity to review all of the information submitted by the parties so that in most cases, 
one and one-half hour per case will be sufficient time to allow the parties to summarize 
their positions, answer the Screening Panel's questions, and elaborate on what they feel 
are important pieces of information. After the hearing, the Panel will deliberate and make 
a decision concerning the case. 
Pursuant to Rule 10(b)(2) of the RLDD, the Respondent is hereby afforded an 
opportunity to appear before the Screening Panel and testify under oath, together with any 
witnesses called by the Respondent, and to present an oral argument with respect to the 
informal complaint. All testimony will be recorded and preserved so long as proceedings 
are pending. In advance of the hearing, Respondents may submit a written brief, not to 
exceed five pages in length unless prior permission is obtained, and the OPC shall forward 
a copy to the Complainant. 
Pursuant to Rules 10(b)(3) and (4) of the RLDD, the Complainant has the right to 
appear before the Screening Panel and to testify under oath, together with any witnesses 
called by the Complainant. The Complainant may be represented by counsel or some 
other representative. The Complainant and the Respondent each have the right to be 
present during the presentation of evidence unless they are excluded from the hearing by 
the Screening Panel Chair or Vice Chair for good cause shown. 
Please be advised that Rule 32(b) of the RLDD provides that "[i]f the 
Respondent, having been ordered by the Committee to appear and having received 
actual notice of that order, fails to appear, the Respondent shall have been deemed to 
have admitted the factual allegations which were the subject of such appearance. The 
Committee shall not, absent good cause, continue or delay proceedings because of 
Respondent's failure to appear." In this respect, this Calendar Notice is the 
Committee's order requiring the Respondent to appear. If the Respondent does not 
appear, the OPC may request that the factual allegations in this matter be deemed 
admitted. 
For good cause, the Complainant, the Respondent, and any witnesses may 
arrange in advance to appear at the hearing by telephone. If you need to request to 
appear by telephone, call Amy Yardley at 801-531-9110. Billy L. Walker is the attorney 
assigned to this case. 
Page 3 of 4 
Requests by the Respondent for continuances from the above-set Screening 
Panel hearing date, unless stipulated to by the OPC, shall be made in writing through 
the OPC to the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee. Upon 
consideration of the position of the OPC and the reasons for the Respondent's request 
for the continuance, the Chair or Vice Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee shall 
decide whether to grant the continuance. 
Scheduled Panel members are: 
Denver Snuffer, Attorney at Nelson, Snuffer, Dahler and Poulsen 
Julie K. Morriss, Attorney Morriss, Bateman, O'Bryant and Compagni 
Justin Toth, Attorney at Ray, Quinney and Nebeker 
Bruce Jackson, Public (non-attorney) Member 
DATED: December _2_^£, 2003. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kate A. Toomey 
Deputy Counsel 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ]2> day of December, 2003, I mailed via 
United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing Calendar Notice to: 
Ray Harding, Jr. 
c/o Greg Skordas 
9 Exchange Place #1104 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Omk OMim 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-000O000-
In re: Judicial Conduct Commission Case No. 20030173-SC 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge; 
03-4D-006 
FINAL ORDER 
The Court hereby acknowledges the receipt of the recommended 
Order of Removal From Office from the Utah Judicial Conduct 
Commission in this matter. In view of the resignation from 
judicial office received from Mr. Harding on February 28, 2003, 
the recommended sanction of removal has become moot, but the 
Court orders that Mr. Harding be permanently disqualified from 




I certify that on the 27th day of March 2003, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, to 
the following addresses: 
Colin Winchester 
Executive Director 
Judicial Conduct Commission 
645 South 200 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ms. Ruth Lybbert, Chairman 
Judicial Conduct Commission 
645 South 200 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-38343 
Edward K. Brass 
Attorney At Law 
175 East 400 South #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Pat H. Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
Honorable Christine M. Durham Chief Justice 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Dear Chief Justice Durham: 
I hereby resign as a district court judge for the fourth Judicial District. I will not seek 
judicial office in the future. 
I deeply regret any cloud my personal problems may have cast upon the fine men and women 
who serve in the judiciary of this state. The only person responsible for my situation is me. I 
apologize to you, my colleagues, and to the people of Utah, While I am not naive about how history 
will regard mc, 1 hope that in some part my legacy will be that I worked hard for many years lo see 
that justice was administered fairly to all who appeared before me. 
Yours, 
w jlymond M. Harding, Jr. V 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FEB 2 8 2003 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
TOTAL P.ai 
